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Introduction 
 
China is a high-corruption state. Yet, despite its prevalence and entrenchment, 
corruption has not undermined China’ economy, social stability and the political 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (the Party). Corruption inches in, and the 
Party fights back.  Corruption and anti-corruption efforts have reached a stalemate 
(Wedeman, 2012). One conventional explanation of China’s ability to manage the 
impact of corruption is China’s “authoritarian resilience” (Nathan, 2005). Since 
Nathan coined the term, it has gained currency and, in different names, such as 
“Beijing Consensus” or “China model”, has become a mainstream explanation of 
China’s economic growth and political sustainability (Kennedy, 2011; Zhao, 2011). 
According to that theory, China’s authoritarianism is resilient because the Party is able 
to adapt to new circumstances without changing the political structure. It is commonly 
noted that while significant changes have taken place at ideological, institutional and 
operational levels, through innovation and adaptation, the Party is able to face the 
challenges that China’s rapid social and economic transitions have posed (Shambaugh, 
2008).      
 
The concept of the China model has crept into the Party thinking and become a catch 
word to highlight China’s social and economic achievement. In a positive spin, 
authoritarianism has become an asset instead of a liability. The China model, as 
narrowly used in China, focuses on the core authoritarian features of the political 
system and brushes aside the innovative and adaptive aspects of the system. Since the 
global financial crisis in 2008, the Party has become more confident about its own 
political system and its way of doing things, and assertive in pushing away 
institutional designs that are regarded as “Western”. This China model has also been 
used to explain the willingness and capacity to control the spread of corruption.   
 
A neglected aspect in the authoritarian thesis is the degree to which China is learning 
from the international best practice based on the principles of transparency, the rule of 
law and public participation (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Peerenboom, 2008). In 
enhancing anti-corruption enforcement, the Party has done more than it is willing to 
admit in creating institutions that may in the long run pose serious challenges to its 
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rule. In essential aspects, China appears to be on the track of the Eastern Asian 
Development mode a steady increase in GDP per capital has allowed more material 
resources for social development, institutional capacity building, and social activism. 
In responses to the economic and social development, the government becomes more 
inclusive and tolerant of different political views and allows the articulation and 
assertion of independent interests. Under enhanced media supervision and the 
mobilization of civil society forces, the government and the general public have 
become less tolerant of corruption. In that model, the social and economic changes, in 
the end, lead to a degree of political liberalization, such as the development of rule of 
law, enhanced level of public participation, more competitive local election, and a 
more transparent and accountable government, all contributing to a more successful 
anticorruption enforcement (Peerenboom, 2008; Zhao, 2011).  
 
This paper argues that anticorruption enforcement in China goes beyond relying on 
the authoritarian measures, such as extra-legal detention or the use of the death 
penalty. The fact that the Party can still hold on to its position in the battle against 
corruption can be better explained by the Party’s ability to learn from overseas 
experiences and to introduce a series of anticorruption initiatives which are 
rule-of-law based, transparency-centered and democracy-driven. One of the best 
examples of China’s extensive borrowing from international best practices is China’s 
active participation in the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) 
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and the faithful implementation of the relevant treaty obligations. Interestingly, while 
China pushes back any UN-based supervisory mechanism in the broadly defined 
human rights areas, it has followed in good faith the recommendations of the UNCAC. 
While a reform initiative may be doomed if it is introduced to improve citizens’ civil 
and political rights, it becomes possible when introduced to enhance anticorruption 
enforcement.  
 
Anticorruption and the Thesis of Authoritarian Resilience  
 
In an ideal type, the China model offers a three-fold argument in relation to corruption 
                                               
1 The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC) on 31 October 2003. The UNCAC calls for its signatory states to enhance the 
force of combating corruption by promoting anti-corruption education and prevention; enhancing 
criminal punishment and anti-corruption enforcement; and strengthening international cooperation. The 
Convention came into force on 14 December 2005. As of July 2012, there were 161 States Parties to 
the UNCAC, including China. “Background of the United Nations Convention against Corruption”, 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html> (Visited on 10 September 2010); “UNCAC 
Signature and Ratification Status as of 12 July 2012”, 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html> (Visited on 13 September 2012). 
China signed and ratified the UNCAC on 10 December 2003 and 13 January 2006 respectively.  
Nations Convention against Corruption”.   
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in China. Firstly, there is the authoritarian efficiency thesis, which argues that China is 
able to maintain a stable political environment, sustainable economic growth and high 
level of human development because of China’s authoritarian system. The identifiable 
characteristics of that model include the absence of political opposition to the Party; 
the dominant role of the Party in state affairs; a parchment division of powers within 
the state and between the state and the society; a rubber stamp congress and a 
compliant judiciary; and, above all, managed public participation. In spite of 
institutional adaptation and innovation, the political structure in its core remains intact 
and the Party remains in control (Naughton and Yang, 2004). The concentration of 
political power allows the Party to make tough decisions and remain decisive in 
designing and achieving its policy objectives, and the decisiveness in decision-making 
and effectiveness in policy implementation in turn allow the Party to better manage 
corruption and reduce the negative impact that corruption may otherwise have.  
 
The structure of corruption differs in different regime types and correspondingly 
corruption may have different impact on the political and economic system (Wedeman, 
1997, 2012). Because of the effective macro-control, corruption in China is more 
“managed” and less destructive and predatory than the case elsewhere. There are 
variants in that argument, ranging from that corruption plays a facilitative role in 
China’s unique economic transition; that corruption is stable and regularized and 
could be absorbed effectively as part of the cost in doing business in China; to that the 
impact of the otherwise predatory corruption is back-loaded with its destructive nature 
to be revealed only in a distant future. Despite the variation, the common thread that 
ties all the argument together is that, while corruption remains prevalent, it is well 
managed in China so as not to undermine the economy and social stability.  
 
Authoritarianism allows the Party to take draconian anticorruption measures that are 
often unconstrained by law and unaccountable to the public. Commentators have 
pointed out the powerful Party disciplinary mechanism that wields extraordinary 
extra-legal power in investigating and disciplining Party officials, including 
extra-legal power of detention incommunicado; aggressive interrogation without legal 
representation; a compliant legal system to rubber-stamp the Party’s decisions; 
periodical campaign against corruption; and the use of harsh penalties (Sapio, 2011). 
Ultimately, it is the disciplinary power of a Leninist Party and its disregards of laws 
and rights that matter the most in anti-corruption enforcement (Hsu, 2011).  
 
Secondly, there is the authoritarian benevolence thesis. According to that thesis, the 
Party is not only powerful but also claims to exercise the power as the guardian of 
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national interest. It is often said that there is an anti-democracy instinct in China’s one 
party state, which co-exists with an anticorruption instinct. The Party gained its 
political power by overthrowing a corrupt regime, and has been vigilant in preventing 
and punishing corruption. As powerful as it is, the Party claims that it does not have 
any interest of its own and holds political powers merely to serve the best interest of 
the nation and the people (Nathan, 1986).  
 
The Party’s claim has historical resonance. It has been said that state leaders in the 
Confucian tradition tend to be paternalistic and more self-constraining in exercising 
power, thus less prone to grand corruption as often observed among dictators 
elsewhere. For all its authoritarian traits, Confucianism emphasizes a strong and 
meritocratic bureaucratic system and personal ethics and moral obligations to be 
accountable to the people, which serve as external and internal controls over the rulers 
(Bell, 2012; Fukuyama, 2005, 2007, 2011). Being moderated by Confucian ethics, 
rulers in that tradition are self-limiting and self-correcting in the exercise of power, 
and there is a built-in self-regulatory mechanism to prevent excessive corruption and 
abuses. As corrupt as they may be, political leaders are committed to nation-building 
and long-term growth (Hsu, Wu and Zhao, 2011) and would not allow corruption to 
undermine their larger nationalist agenda.  
 
Under that cultural tradition, corruption may be less predatory and less destructive to 
the economy (Wedeman, 1997). In the Chinese case, the Party is ready to 
acknowledge the shocking degree of corruption within the political system and the 
potential political damage that corruption may inflict, and is determined to face up to 
the challenges. Importantly, Party leaders in China are not widely known to be 
predatory in enriching themselves that characterize other high-corruption states. 
Simply put, China is not (yet) a kleptocracy.  
 
Finally, there is the authoritarian legitimacy thesis. Because of the combination of 
efficiency with benevolence, the authoritarian government receives wide popular 
support, with labor, entrepreneur, and the middle class all expressing a high level of 
trust on the regime (Bell, 2012; Nathan, 1995; Perry, 2007; Wright, 2010). Indeed, the 
trust is so high that there is little need for mobilization and non-institutional 
participation. The high trust manifests itself in two characteristics. Firstly, 
anticorruption activities are locally-oriented with goals rarely going beyond attracting 
the attention of higher authorities, punishing corrupt local officials and stopping 
egregious local practices. Petitioners, protesters and other stakeholders who 
demonstrate a high degree of deference to, and confidence in, the higher level 
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authority’s commitment and competence in solving the problem, are more prone to 
petition to higher authorities. In doing so, they expressly attribute the cause of the 
corruption squarely to the failure in policy implementation at the local levels and 
abuse of local officials in the process (Bell, 2012; Li, 2008). In sum, it is the bad 
apples that are to blame. 
 
Secondly, anti-corruption activism is rule-based and anti-corruption protest does not 
go beyond the implementation of rights as provided in Party norms and state laws. 
There is abundant “rule consciousness” but a deficit of “right consciousness” 
independent of the Party rules and state laws (Perry, 2007). Rights consciousness, 
where it exists, is based on, and derives from, rule consciousness (Lorentzen and 
Scoggins, 2010). Perry (2007), doubting the possibility of a “rights” discourse in 
China, goes as far as arguing that the state proclamation of rights is not different from 
the state propaganda in the past of “class struggle”. Therefore, protest in post-Mao 
China is not qualitatively different from that in Mao’s China and both are 
regime-supportive, sharing similar protest symbols, repertoire and goals. Extending 
the argument to its logic end, anticorruption enforcement is authorized and controlled 
by the state and operate according to the official rules of the game (Perry, 2007: 21). 
As such, it is neither politically destabilizing nor regime subversive.
2
        
     
Anti-Corruption Initiatives: From Transparency to Participation 
 
The following section of this paper provides three examples of international learning: 
1) auditing of government budget and expenditure to enhance fiscal accountability; 2) 
open government information (OGI) system to allow better access to government 
information; and 3) the rise of social media which mobilizes anticorruption activism 
in the civil society. These three examples are chosen for three related reasons in 
addition to the fact that they are widely discussed in China. Firstly, these examples 
represent anticorruption intervention at different levels. Government auditing 
represents a top-down intervention and works mainly inside government departments; 
OGI represents a dynamic interaction between civil society actors and the government; 
and social media offers both opportunity and incentives for a spontaneous and 
bottom-up social mobilization.  
                                               
2 China’s acceptance of authoritarian rule and tolerance of government corruption are often studied in 
the particular Chinese cultural setting in which corruption is practiced. China’s gift-giving culture and 
the imperatives of reciprocity in personal relationship provide a fertile ground on which corruption 
grows. Indeed, many commentators have argued that corruption and gift-giving may be 
indistinguishable to a significant degree and it is impossible for the law to identify where gift-giving 
ends and where corruption begins. Cultural tolerance of gift-giving and reciprocity desensitizes corrupt 
transaction, and the embeddedness of corruption in the cultural practice allows the society to absorb the 
destructive impact of corruption. 
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Secondly, those examples serve as proxies for larger policy changes and point to the 
direction of future and more structural reform. Auditing and its accountability 
structure invite congressional oversight of government fiscal policies and therefore 
enhance the separation of powers in China’s political system; OGI mechanisms 
demand transparency, accountability and the rule of law in the government 
decision-making process; and social media provides the best opportunity of 
democratic deliberation and political participation in China. Finally, all three 
mechanisms are concerned with access to information. An authoritarian system 
habitually misinforms its citizens and the best antidote for corruption, as supplied by 
the three reform mechanisms, is to place the government “under the sunshine”.  
 
Government Auditing 
 
The structural problem in China’s “unusual” budgetary system and the lack of 
accountability in government expenditure (Wong and Bird, 2008) mattered 
significantly in explaining the prevalence of corruption and its resilience. On the 
budgetary side, it is well-known that extra-budgetary fund (EBF) is widely used to 
compensate for the budgetary shortfall and to enhance government revenues. EBF 
includes fees, fines, levies and other hidden revenues that the government permits but 
does not effectively control. Local governments are too eager to explore extra-revenue 
to meet their expenditure. On the expenditure side, there is little meaningful 
monitoring and accountability and individual departments have wide discretion in the 
fiscal process. The combination of discretion in revenue-collection and the lack of 
control in expenditure naturally led to wide-spread misconduct and corruption. 
Officials kept part of the money collected in their own pockets before handing them 
over to the departments, and departments with a fee-generating capacity set up their 
own secretive “small treasuries” and spend the money they collect for their own 
benefit (Fu and Choy, 2004; Wedeman, 2000). 
 
A significant first step in the fiscal reform undertaken by Zhu Rongji as the Premier 
was to remove the power to collect fees and levies from individual officials, with the 
ultimate goal to create a clear separation between revenue-gathering and from 
expenditure in the fiscal system. Before Zhu’s reform, for example, traffic police were 
required to issues tickets to drivers for violating road traffic rules and collect fines on 
the spot. Not surprisingly, officers were eager to issue as many tickets as possible and 
personally keep as much of the fines as they could. After the reform, fines would be 
paid directly into a government banking account and money would no longer change 
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hands between police and drivers. A simple mechanism of payment changes the 
landscape of police corruption on the streets (Fu and Choy, 2003).  
 
Once placing individual level corruption under some control, the government moved 
the next target to “small treasuries” and the principal tool in policing illicit “small 
treasuries” and illicit spending is government auditing. Constitutionally, auditing 
agencies are accountable directly to the corresponding people’s congress. In 1983, the 
first national audit office, the China National Audit Office (CNAO) was established 
with the responsibility to investigate the accounts of government departments. In 1995 
the Audit Law was promulgated and the first comprehensive auditing took place in 
1996. Under the Audit Law, the auditing offices review the budget implementation of 
all government entities and all public funds and assets are the targets of audit (Li, 
1998). As Li Jinhua, a former Auditor General of the CNAO said that the CNAO is 
the “watchdog” of state assets with the duties to ensure a degree of fiscal rule of law 
and fiscal transparency.  
 
The CNAO conducted its first serious audit in 1999 which revealed widespread 
irregularities, wastage and abuses on the part of the central ministries, including 
delayed preparation of budgetary plans, lax fiscal management, misuse of EBF, and 
diversion of EBF for profit-making activities. The Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) favorably received the report. Although the report 
and the reporting process were not well covered in the media, it was the first time that 
China rigorously audited central ministries and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and 
reported the auditing results to the standing Committee of the NPC (Bao, 2004).   
 
Incidentally, aggressive publicity of audit reports was inspired by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). In 2001, while Premier Zhu Rongji was 
receiving David Walker, the U.S. Comptroller General, Head of the GAO, the guest 
mentioned the audit information disclosure system that was implemented in the U.S.. 
Upon knowing that such a system existed in China, the Premier made the decision 
that as long as the information was accurate, they should be truly and 
comprehensively reported to the NPC’s Standing Committee (Bao, 2004).  
 
The decision to publicize auditing reports was implemented in 2003 after Wen Jiabo 
became the Premier. On 25 June 2003, Li Jinhua submitted to the NPCSC the 2002 
audit report of the central government organs. It was a critical report in which 
powerful ministries were named and censured in public. The wording of the report 
was direct and sharp, and allegations were clearly made and supported by evidence. 
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With the 2003 report widely made public, Li Jinhua started the so-called “Audit 
Storm” which swept through the central ministries.        
 
The CNAO auditing has uncovered shocking level of corruption and waste in both 
central and local governments and in both government departments and State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), and the revelations has also led to certain disciplinary and legal 
actions against officials directly involved in the corrupt practices. While there were 
reservations on the long term impact of the audit storms, the CNAO is duly credited 
for its courage in confronting and unveiling problems that have long been in 
existence.
3
 Since 2003, the scope of audit has gradually expanded from auditing 
income and expenditure to covering effectiveness of government fiscal management, 
including unreasonable budget estimation, slow progress in project implementation; 
and inappropriate policies in the SOEs. Attempts are also made to extend the audit 
storm to local governments although auditing at local levels proves to be more 
difficult. At the central level, the CNAO continues to conduct rigorous audits, 
publicize the names of offending organs, and recommend solutions, in spite of the 
resistance from some central Ministries.  
 
Open Government Information 
 
The Open Government Information Regulations (OGI Regulations) took effect in 
2008. The law requires all administrative agencies, subject to certain conditions, to 
publicize or make available information they have created or obtained in the course of 
carrying out their duties and to provide information to members of the public upon 
request. There is a statutory requirement for government departments to supply 
certain information through government reports, official websites, press conferences, 
broadcasting, television, etc. and to send certain information to designated archives 
and public libraries for public access. Regarding disclosure on application, applicants 
may only apply for disclosure of information that relates to their “special needs for 
production, livelihood activities or scientific research”. An administrative organ may 
refuse to disclose government information on the ground of state secret, commercial 
secret, or involvement of privacy of a third party. With the promulgation of the OGI 
Regulations, Chinese citizens enjoy a limited legal right to know.  
 
While the OGI system is mandated by the UNCAC, it also drew broadly from 
international experiences and reflected a domestic need for transparency and 
                                               
3 The auditing page on the People Net provides detailed information. 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/8215/34856/index.html.  
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accountability. OGI is part of China’s on-going open government initiatives, including 
earlier programs on “transparency in government affairs”, and other OGI initiatives.  
While there are significant legal, political and cultural hurdles to the successful 
implementation of the OGI Regulations (Fu, 2009; Horsley, 2010), the OGI 
Regulations provide an additional stimulus to enhance transparency, strengthen 
accountability, and improve governance. If the Administrative Litigation Law, which 
allows citizens to file complaints in courts against a specific violation of the law or 
dereliction of duty on the part of the government, provides a shield for citizens to 
protect their rights from official infringement, the OGI Regulations are, potentially, 
swords for citizens to monitor the government more proactively and effectively.  
 
There is also a strong demand for OGI in China’s emerging civil society. Activist 
lawyers, reporters, and other informed members of the society are mobilizing the law to 
push for a more open government. Most noticeably, green NGOs have been working to 
increase both the supply of and demand for government information. On the supply 
side, they have organized training for officials in environmental protection agencies 
and assisted in drafting more detailed and meaningful local rules on accessing 
environmental information. On the demand side, they have worked with lawyers and 
activists in requesting information and bringing the authorities to court when their 
requests are denied (Horsley, 2010). 
 
Activist lawyers and rights advocates have indeed seized the opportunity to exercise the 
right to know upon the promulgation of the law. Xu Zhiyong and Gongmeng (also 
known as “Open Constitution Initiative” in English) have been active in identifying 
cases to test the OGI Regulations.
3
 Another veteran lawyer, Hao Jinsong, is also 
actively involved in OGI cases.
4
 There are encouraging signs of academic activism on 
access to government information, and more law professors are filing applications for 
information disclosure and bringing cases to public and media attention. Tsinghua 
University law professor Chen Jie filed an application requesting information related to 
the Wenchuan earthquake from the State Earthquake Administration; and three Peking 
University law professors battled with the Beijing Highway Administration regarding 
information on the use of highway levies.
5
 A Shenyang resident, Wen Hongxiang, 
requested in an online posting that the Finance Bureau of Shenyang City disclose 
government entertainment expenses.
7
 It is cheerful news in virtual space but 
embarrassing for the city government. Others followed suit immediately and started to 
make similar demands in other cities related to other information. Demand for 
information regarding officials’ income soon turned to queries about the budget and 
government spending. After the central government announced a four 
 10 
trillion RMB economic stimulus plan, Shanghai lawyer Yan Yiming immediately 
requested publication of the details.
8
  
 
To the credit of the government at all levels, a large amount of government 
information has already been publicized within the short history of the 
implementation of the OGI Regulations, and the system has improved in spite of the 
limitation in its institutional design and implementation. . Indeed, the government has 
also used the OGI mechanism to enhance bureaucratic control and ensure faithful 
implementation of central policies. By providing information through official 
websites, press conferences and other means in a timely fashion, the government can 
guide, shape, and, in the end, control public opinions.  
  
Generally speaking, the items of information that are voluntarily disclosed by the 
central and provincial governments have been increasing since 2008, while those 
disclosed by city governments have remained largely unchanged. On the other hand, 
the number of OGI-based requests for information from city governments has 
increase quickly although that from the central and provincial governments has 
changed little. Another healthy sign is the increase in judicial review applications in 
spite of the judicial caution and passivism (Chen, 2012).  
 
There are great variations and some places are performing much better than others.  
It is important to assess the performance closely to develop a clear understanding as to 
what makes a difference. In a large-scale study (Lorentzen, Landry and Yasuda, 2010), 
the OGI performance of 113 cities were assessed according to eight dimensions. The 
overall performance was disappointing: with 63 points out of a total of 100 as basic 
compliance, the means score was 31.06 and the median was only 26.6. The lowest 
reached 10.2. But an otherwise critical review also pointed to the potential of OGI in 
China. The highest score in the survey attained 72.9 points. The best predictor for 
good performance was the wealth of the city: better developed infrastructure and 
institutions for the OGI system; better-managed and more open government; better 
educated and informed residents with more demand for open government. In addition, 
wealthy cities tend to rely less on SOEs and have a more diversified economy. Other 
factors contributing to better OGI in a city included the education background of 
mayors, with cities administered by mayors with legal training background doing 
better than others; and the length of services of the mayors in a city — the longer the 
stay, the better the OGI system. OGI is thus likely to improve when cities accumulate 
their wealth, diversify their economy and make a smart decision in choosing their 
leaders.          
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Like the rule of law in general, the OGI Regulations are a double-edged sword. While 
they empower and legitimize the government through information management and 
control, the regulations are a useful tool in the hands of the citizens and have also 
developed the potential to constrain government power (Horsley, 2010). As part of the 
on-going reform to liberalize governance in China, the new OGI Regulations have the 
potential to help drive the development of a more transparent, responsive, and 
accountable government. The litmus test in the decade to come is:  whether the 
government can be forced, through litigation, public opinion, or other means, to 
publicize information that is inconvenient, embarrassing, or even outright offensive to 
the government. 
 
The Rise of Social Media 
 
A free and independent press is often regarded as a necessary condition for clean 
government, and countries with a higher level of press freedom tend to have a lower 
level of corruption. Since corruption is mostly a consensual crime that happens in the 
dark, a free press with its probing investigative journalism is regarded as indispensible 
to bring corruption to light. In democracies, publicity of corruption scandals could 
mobilize public support, generate pressure to force corrupt officials to resign, and 
ultimately causes an electoral defeat of the political party that is implicated in 
corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).  
 
The Chinese press does not share the major characteristics that define a free press, 
however. In China, there is little open political competition, low level of public 
participation and weak protection of civil and political rights, in particular the 
freedom of speech. On the contrary, the press is owned and controlled by the Party 
and the Party has historically placed severe restrictions on investigative reporting, 
especially the reporting of the negative events such as corruption.   
 
Yet, for a combination of reasons, the press in China has been playing a significant 
role in exposing certain corruption and forcing the Party to take more anti-corruption 
actions. Firstly, there is the agency problem and central authorities, because of 
information asymmetry, need to rely on the press to expose local corruption so as to 
discipline local officials more effectively. Economic reform has led to an increase in 
local political powers and an increase in local corruption and abuses in violation of 
central rules. In this new context, the media, as a controlled forum, is well placed to 
serve as “representatives and trustees of the public, translating raw public opinion into 
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a collective, supervisory role.” (Cheung, 2007: 363) In doing so, media develops a 
potential to become an influential actor in monitoring the government (Liberman, 
2005).  
 
Secondly, the media in the reform era has developed a self-interest in aggressive news 
reporting. Forced to be financially independent, the media is managed as a business 
and has to follow business logic. Like its counterparts in a market economy, media in 
China relies on advertizing revenue which in turn relies on circulation and reader 
preference. Corruption scandals are provocative and popular news among readers and 
there are sufficient incentives in the media for journalists to launch their own 
investigation, as illustrated by the popularity and resilience of investigative journalism 
in China (Cullen and Fu, 1998).  
 
Finally, formal education, in conjunction with opportunities and incentives, nurtures 
an emerging professional identity within the journalist community. Inspired by some 
exemplary reporters who courageously and strategically covered controversial cases, 
and influenced by global media, a generation of reporters have emerged who are no 
longer satisfied with the status quo. Without challenging the political system directly, 
many of the journalists have developed a strong sense of social responsibility, are 
passionate about social justice issues and are prepared to expose the dark side in 
business and government. Indeed, major scandals in the recent decade, ranging from 
Sun Zhigang’s death to the melamine-tainted milk formula, are exposed by 
courageous reporters who are willing to take the risk.     
 
Of course, state media is under the tight control of the Party and, within the 
authoritarian political structure, it is unlikely to become an independent watchdog 
(Cheung, 2007; Keller, 2003). Weak state monitoring and control over officials has 
led to a more society-based anti-corruption activism in exposing corruption through 
naming and shaming on the Internet. A most significant development in China since 
the 1990s is undoubtedly the emergence of social media and the vibrant online 
activism. The advance of information technology allows almost instantaneous 
reporting on corruption as it occurs in spite of widespread censorship. In a society 
well-known for its tight press control and censorship, social media provides an 
alternative source for information and a new platform for action. Since the Party’s 
promotion of Internet as a supervisory tool in 2008 (and the famous online chat 
between the Party General Secretary Hu Jintao and members of the public), Chinese 
netizens have developed a culture of cyberactivism in which ordinary citizens expose 
misconduct and scandals, and, through a coordinated search, commonly referred to as 
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“human flesh search” (HFS)4 (Downey, 2010), identify and hunt down corrupt 
officials.  
 
Examples abound in which the netizen-led action has led to successful publicity, 
investigation and prosecution. An official from Nanjing was pictured when making a 
speech criticizing developers for selling property at below-market value. The speech 
was controversial and attracted public attention. He was hunted and was later 
identified as Zhou Jiugen, a district housing management bureau chief. In the photo, 
he was smoking an expensive brand of cigarette (called “95 Supreme”) which sells at 
1,500 RMB per carton). From a pack of cigarette, netizens through HFS discovered 
Zhou’s expensive watch, car and in general a luxury life style. The continuous 
exposure finally led to an official investigation. Zhou was subsequently sentenced to 
11 year imprisonment for taking 1.2 million RMB in bribes.
5
 In another case, an 
official who was pictured smiling at a tragic traffic accident scene angered netizens. 
Through collective vigilantism, they identified the person as the Shaanxi Safety 
Inspection Bureau Chief, Yang Daicai. Further HFS revealed that Yang wore different 
watches, all expensive ones, on different occasions. All the photos were posted online 
with highlights on the watches and calls for further investigation.
6
 In response, Yang 
was removed from his post.      
 
The intrusive HFS has on many occasions degenerated into online mob rule — “a 21st 
century version of the medieval ‘stockade’” (Eberlein, 2008; see also Chao, 2008), 
but when the search aims at corruption, the intrusion and aggression prove to be the 
most effective anti-corruption tool - “a 24-hour-a-day nightmare for government 
officials across China” (Mackinnon, 2012). HFS organizes the otherwise isolated 
individuals into a collective action and facilitates the creation of online anticorruption 
communities. Through their online activism and offline mobilization, dedicated 
members of the public have exposed wrongful death in custody and condemned police 
abuse of power; forced the judiciary to respond to public opinions and revise their 
decisions; and brought the vivid image of corrupt and abusive officials before the 
public. Through the online mobilization, HFR nurtures a civic anticorruption culture 
and influences the official media. Social media therefore sets the agenda in the 
inter-media relations and anticorruption information flows from the social media to 
                                               
4 Downey (2010 ) defined the term as follows:  
Human-flesh search engines — renrou sousuo yinqing — have become a Chinese phenomenon: 
they are a form of online vigilante justice in which Internet users hunt down and punish people 
who have attracted their wrath. The goal is to get the targets of a search fired from their jobs, 
shamed in front of their neighbors, run out of town. It’s crowd-sourced detective work, pursued 
online — with offline results. 
5 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscente/2008-12/28/content_10572187.htm. 
6 http://news.qq.com/a/20120828/001020.htm#p=6. 
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state media. Because of the aggressive HFS, corruption scandals and critical 
reflections first appear in social media, and are followed up, not without some 
reluctance, by the official media if only try to remain relevant and to mould public 
mood. With over 500 million Internet users keenly watching the government, the 
Internet is bound to be an influential political actor which is hard to rein in. 
 
In response, the Party has become more responsive to cyberactivism by taking 
effective remedial actions. Typically, as in Zhou Jiugen’s case and many other cases, 
the Party orders a prompt investigation once detecting a collective wrath from the 
public and, not surprisingly, finds sufficient evident that warrants a disciplinary action 
or criminal punishment. The official action is often swift and the officials, with the 
issue involving them, vanish quickly from public view. Beyond the individual cases, 
the government stays engaged with the online civil societal forces. Auditing may be 
distorted, and OGI-based application may be denied, but the battle against corruption 
has been fought in the court of public opinions through public mobilization. In the end, 
the Party is forced to take the pulse of public opinions carefully and to treat it 
seriously.  
 
 
Authoritarian Resilience and Anticorruption Initiatives  
 
Those anticorruption efforts have had certain positive impact on China’s 
anticorruption enforcement. Firstly, they signal the commitment and determination of 
the Party to control the further spread of corruption. Party leaders have on countless 
occasions openly admitted existential challenges posed by corruption, often framed in 
life or death terms. Former Premier Zhu Rongji was well-known for his tough talks on 
anti-corruption.
7
 Presidents Hu Jintao and others have repeatedly warned that the 
Party and the nation would collapse if corruption cannot be placed under effective 
control. It is of course the Party’s own decision to allow the CNAO to publicize 
shocking mismanagement, embezzlement and stealing of public funds within the 
central Ministries; to allow citizens to ask probing questions; and to tolerate HFS 
which has produced many embarrassing moments for the Party. In the past two 
decades, the Party has regularly supplied new anticorruption mechanisms, and the  
discussion surrounding them have generated a positive policy environment that 
enhances people’s trust in the central authority and encourages institutional 
participation. Those new initiatives make anticorruption a live issue, supply the much 
                                               
7 To demonstrate his anti-corruption determination, Zhu stated in a press conference in 2008 that he 
would prepare 100 coffins — 99 for corrupt officials and one for himself.   
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needed oxygen into the routine anticorruption efforts and make anticorruption a 
sustainable enterprise.  
 
Secondly, the continuous supply of anticorruption measures engages the public and 
incorporates the elite into institutional reforms. Political reform remains a taboo issue 
and is not open to serious public discussion. However, when an anticorruption, good 
governance reform is initiated, it blows fresh air into an otherwise suffocating 
political circumstance. Most of the reform measures have attracted tremendous public 
interest and scrutiny, and regularly involve a large number of experts, professionals 
and the general public in the legislative and policy-making process from consultation, 
promulgation, implementation to evaluation. Government officials in charge are eager 
to promote the new initiatives; scholars and experts as a matter of routine are invited 
to give their views and to put the reform in a proper historical and comparative 
perspective; and lawyers and other activists test the feasibility of a new scheme and 
scrutinize undertakings made by the government. The deliberation on the potentials of 
those measures captures the imagination of the otherwise frustrated audience.  
 
Those mechanisms are not merely empty talks or window dressing. They deliver in 
part and create their own winners and losers. Each anticorruption initiative opens its 
own space and opportunities for legal action and political reform. The mechanisms 
may be structurally defective in design and poor in their implementation and as such 
they attract waves of criticisms that they deserve. But after all the criticisms are 
voiced, people continue to go back to the mechanisms for future improvement. The 
audit reports could be more effectively implemented; courts should have been more 
active in creating and enforcing the right to know in OGI-based judicial review; and 
there could be better coordination between online activism and offline mobilization in 
anticorruption activities. As defective as they are, those mechanisms do not generate a 
wholesale rejection and cynicism which may lead to radicalism.                  
 
For many NGOs working on the ground to advocate social justice, the OGI and other 
innovative measures are much needed tools to engage the system. Imagine an 
environmental NGO trying to enforce environmental accountability against polluting 
factories, such as the well-known case of the Yunnan-based environmental NGO, 
Green Watershed, doing its tough battle against the Luliang Chemical Industry Co., 
Ltd for dumping the highly toxic chromium residue into the Nanpan River, causing 
cancers and other diseases among villagers residing nearby.
8
 The OGI law is one of 
                                               
8  Why Have Our Appeals for Information Disclosure Been Ignored? 
http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/?p=1010. 
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the few institutional tools in Green Watershed’s possession to engage the authorities 
and compel them to act. Through online mobilization, Green Watershed successfully 
drew wide public attention to the case. After all, the toxic has produced a cancer 
village near the Nanpan River which happens to be the source of Pearl River in 
Guangdong. But online activism cannot replace offline action and when it comes to 
offline mobilization, the OGI system offers the best available tool to initiate an action. 
Armed with the OGI regulations and the implementing rules, the Green Watershed 
have tried approach the provincial environmental protection department, the bank that 
finances the enterprise and the banking regulatory agency for a wide-range of 
information. OGI-based action is clearly a tempting and useful stepping stone into 
government offices.  
 
Finally, those anticorruption initiatives offer a hope that corruption can be solved 
through incremental institutional innovation, and the accumulated effect of small 
changes may ultimately reach a tipping point in the political system. The institutional 
innovation may be ineffective to control grand corruption that happens at the higher 
echelon of the government, but it is effective in putting the routine and petty 
corruption that directly affect the daily life activities of ordinary people under some 
effective control. Ordinary citizens are most vigilant in monitoring frontline 
representatives of the Party-state, such as tax collectors, police officers, judges and 
urban management personnel, and it is not surprising that Chinese social media is full 
of reports on abuse and corruption in matters that concern the daily life of the 
ordinary people. When corruption at the lower end is controlled, corruption is 
removed from public view. While undoubtedly continuing to exist, corruption has 
become hidden and become a more remote issue for the ordinary citizens. A tighter 
control and discipline of the lower level civil servants generate more public 
confidence in the system and could solidify the system at its foundational level.   
 
At the same time, anticorruption initiatives offer hope for more structural reforms. 
The aggressive auditing offers some hope of top-down anti-corruption reform within 
the government ministries. The regular auditing and the revelation of systematic 
misuse of public fund and embezzlement appear to be an excellent entry point to 
political reform at a structural level. The fact that a Ministry could keep and misuse 
millions of dollars raises a series of questions relating to financial accountability, 
budgetary process, congressional oversight and, ultimately, tax-payers’ rights. In 
direct response to the auditing storm, the NPC, potentially as an alternative power 
house, strengthens its grip over the fiscal process by setting up an independent Budget 
Committee. There has also been discussion to further legislative enactment to place 
 17 
the revenue and spending powers of the government organs under more effective 
congressional control.  
 
OGI offers a similar opportunity at a deeper structural level. After the promulgation of 
the OGI Regulations, ordinary people have developed a keen interest in knowing 
government entertainment budget and assets of Party officials. The new OGI 
Regulations, the subsequent legal actions and lively online discussions surrounding 
the matter are nurturing a healthy dose of cynicism about officialdom and, from which, 
a culture of political accountability. There is now mounting pressure for a legislation 
to compel Party and state officials to disclose their personal assets.  
 
Finally, the Internet offers the best accountability mechanism and the best forum of 
democratic participation in China. Undoubtedly, with its strong Chinese 
characteristics, HFS is a convenient and effective instrument in the on-going popular 
war against corruption. The collective online vigilance galvanizes public support, puts 
officials on notice and compels the Party to take effective and visible remedial actions. 
Significantly, the Internet is creating an alternative community of voices and an 
alternative source of power in the virtual world in competition with those in the real 
world. The Internet is set to continue to offer forums and possibilities for more 
institutionalized public deliberation and political participation (Leib and He, 2006; 
Jiang, 2008; Yang, 2010).  
    
The Limit of Authoritarian Adaptation  
 
China’s authoritarian resilience has its limit and the authoritarian thesis mentioned at 
the beginning of the paper is substantially weakened upon closer examination. First of 
all, the benevolent thesis is being falsified in front of the eyes of the general public. 
The Bo Xilai affairs and the aftermath reveal the uglier side of the political system 
and the shocking scale of violence, corruption and moral decay among political elites. 
The scandal challenges the myth of the Chinese exceptionalism and lays bare the fact 
that despite the tough rhetoric, the Party, with corrupt interest institutionalized and 
entrenched at the core, is not able to control the spread of corruption. Contrary to the 
claim of benevolence, political corruption is reaching, and is seen to reach, the Party’s 
political core and running out of control. While China no longer has a single despot 
and will not resemble other kleptocracies in the structure and pattern of corruption, it 
is developing its own predatory corruption and increasingly, the Party itself is seen as 
part of the problem instead of the solution. For some, China practices “crony 
communism” (Dickson, 2011) in which predatory Party leaders rob the nation of its 
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wealth (Pei, 2006). Greed and corruption exposed by the CNAO and the petty 
corruption that the HFS exposes are slowly eating away at the Party’s credibility.   
 
Without the anticorruption credibility it claims, the authoritarian system is not as 
efficient as it appears when confronted with powerful interests and a massive 
corruption problem. The shortage of political will aside, China’s authoritarianism is 
highly fragmented and the complicated policy process, which relies heavily on 
vertical and horizontal consensual building through negotiation, renders 
implementation of anticorruption policies extremely difficult (Lieberthal, 1995). After 
all the rough rhetoric against corruption, the Party’s investigation rarely leads to 
criminal prosecution, and indeed merely a tiny percentage of the officials investigated 
by the Party’s disciplinary machinery for corruption are later prosecuted in court. 
China runs a soft anti-corruption regime in which criminal law, despite the recent 
amendment and expansion, remains marginal. It remains the case that the Party’s soft 
law prevails and the Party largely internalizes its own corruption problem. While the 
Party will continue to prosecute egregious cases, it will also make sure that 
prosecution would not sabotage the political loyalty of its members. The political 
imperative necessitates highly selective investigation and prosecution.  
 
While many of the anticorruption initiatives are innovative, they tinkers at the margin 
of politics and become diluted during implementation. The innovative measures such 
as auditing, OGI, media exposures may not be able to tame the corrupt impulse within 
the Party, and the piecemeal institutional reform may not have the potential to serve 
as a catalyst for further structural change. Take audit for example, realistically what 
the auditors could achieve beyond the naming and blaming of some individual 
offenders is highly doubtful. As a subordinate organ of the State Council, the 
CNAO’s power is limited because it faces a problem that is common to the entire 
government. Central ministries are powerful. Financial irregularities, and for that 
matter, corrupt practices, are not regarded as a politically risky business. At the end of 
the day, a few officials may receive Party discipline or criminal punishment, but the 
same institutional corruption re-surfaces every year. As the People’s Net — the 
official website of People’s Daily, the Party’s official newspaper — conceded in one 
of its online editorials that it is difficult to uncover problems, but it is more difficult to 
solve them.
9
  
 
It is not surprising that anticorruption initiatives may be launched in a highly 
ritualistic fashion but fall far short in their implementation. The Party is decisive in 
                                               
9 “What Do We Expect?” http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/8215/34856/index.html. 
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making new policies one after another, but it is far less resilient in their 
implementation because of the nature of authoritarian decision making (Cox and 
McCubbins, 2001). The anticorruption policy process has a relatively short time span, 
and it rises and falls at short intervals. When a new program is initiated, there is no 
shortage of good will and determination to make it work. Each initiative could 
potentially have a significant impact in a particular policy area and offer a possible 
entry point into the larger political system. After all, the initiatives such as auditing, 
OGI, and many others have worked in other societies and could be made to work in 
China only if properly implemented.  
 
Because of the initial political support, especially the personal endorsement of top 
leaders, such as Zhu Rongji’s support of auditing, Wen Jiabao’s endorsement of OGI, 
and Hu Jintao’s famous online chat with netizens, initial implementation is normally 
smooth. Reformers within the government or civil society sectors are able to score a 
few initial victories and those successes would then be widely reported, discussed and 
endorsed in the policy circle, among academia and on the media. Success generates 
hope and reformers inch forward and move deeper into the political system until they 
encounter more structural difficulties and are pushed back. Can applicants ask 
anything about the Party’s spending power and the real operation of the system? Can 
the NPC punish Ministers for financial irregularities and outright corruption? And to 
what degree can corruption be fully investigated and reported on the media? Those are 
the challenging questions that do not have easy answers in China’s political system.    
 
Given the political constraints, institutional innovation, while continuous, is bound to 
be “shallow” and scratch at surfaces. Anticorruption reform, which has been most 
active in the past decade, shifts from one policy area to the other without creating 
sustainable results. Some anticorruption initiatives are of course more resilient than 
others, but each initiative on its own does not bite and it is impossible for an isolated 
mechanism to coalesce into a comprehensive anticorruption momentum. 
Anticorruption enforcement appears like a hit-and-miss, guerilla warfare and does not 
develop a systemic, deep-level engagement. At the end of the day, anticorruption 
enforcement creates shocks more than hope; and offers surprises more than remedies. 
There are abundant examples of short-term fixes with little long-term planning.  
 
Finally, the authoritarian state may have encountered more difficulties than the 
conventional theories admit in its search for legitimacy (Bell, 2012). The base of the 
legitimacy, according to the China model, lies in part in the trust in the Party to 
control corruption. Accordingly, while people loathe local corruption, they place their 
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faith in the Party to sort out the problem. The logic of the Chinese authoritarianism is 
the reliance on the central patriarch as panacea to end all the local abuses. As a result, 
petitions regarding local grievances go to Beijing for a quick fix (Minzner, 2006). But 
that design ironically weakens the level of trust and undermines Beijing’s legitimacy, 
as the petitioners soon find out local officials do not cause all the miseries on their 
own and the central authorities are also part of the problem. When that happens, 
people may suspend their deference to the central authority, challenge the credibility 
and legitimacy of the system and resort to assertive, disruptive, and radical 
mobilization (Li, 2008, Pils, 2012). As Li (2008: 222) puts it, “High trust in the center 
induces petitioning which then may devastate that trust and thereby induce more 
aggressive popular actions.”      
 
People’s trust in the Party and deference to authorities in general may be waning when 
they are less economically reliant on the government. Generally, economic freedom 
leads to political freedom in which economically independent people are more 
demanding of their government and less tolerant of government abuses and corruption 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2008; Fukuyama, 1995). Rule consciousness and rights 
consciousness may be a distinction without significant difference in understanding the 
struggles for rights in their daily life (Li, 2010; Wong, 2011). As manifested in 
organized rallies and demonstration, people’s concerns are more than egregious 
practice and petty corruption and their petitions often go beyond the implementation 
of existing rules as such. As HFS-exposed scandals seem to show, people are curious 
about petty corruption but they also cast significant doubt on the legitimacy of the 
system. Beyond the immediate grievances, citizens are demanding the right to know, 
the right to be heard, the right to express and, above all, the right to participate. In the 
online and offline mobilization against corruption, official rules, which are tolerant of 
misconduct, are hardly relevant. 
 
If the faith in the political and legal institutions is fading, would people continue to 
channel their grievances through the institutions on which they no longer have faith? 
Would lawyers and other civil society forces continue to rely on the institutional 
means and implement incremental reforms? How would the society react when 
citizens who report corruption and misconduct are harassed by the government, sued 
by officials for defamation, or detained by the police (van Rooij, 2012)? To use the 
Green Watershed example again, the OGI Regulations empowered the NGO in the 
initial stage of the engagement by allowing a dialogue with department agencies. But 
all the departments declined to intervene and denied the application on dubious legal 
grounds: the bank cited commercial trade secret; the regulatory body pushed the 
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applicant to the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) and the EPA said it 
lacked the technical capacity to fill its duty. Something was clearly operating behind 
the scene to frustrate the exercise of a legal right, but there is little that the NGO can 
do to initiate a meaningful action. Would the Green Watershed or any other NGO 
continue to rely on the OGI system in demanding rights and advocating changes or 
engaging in more direct political activism?    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is evident that most of the reform in the past decade has been geared directly or 
indirectly toward anticorruption enforcement, and despite the political inertia, the 
government has produced significant institutional changes in the anticorruption field. 
At least, the Party has faced up to the challenges and kept the anticorruption 
momentum going forward. Corruption is spreading and entrenching itself; the Party is 
also digging in; and the battle against corruption continues.  
 
Conventional understanding has it that China fights against corruption in its own 
authoritarian way by relying on draconian measures to show-case its commitment and 
determination. Instead of transparency, separation of powers and the rule of law which 
are tested international best practices, the concentration of powers in one authoritarian 
Party best explains the Party’s effective control over corruption. The draconian 
measures achieve a high degree of efficiency in containing the further spread of 
corruption and legitimacy among the ordinary people. They offer a Chinese model to 
the world.   
  
This paper argues that the authoritarian efficiency is not the whole story in explaining 
anticorruption policies in China. It may not even be the main story. China has been 
active in learning from the international best practices and indeed most of its 
anticorruption policies follow closely the formula provided by the UNCAC and other 
bodies including the World Bank, the OECD, and Transparency International. While 
the Party remains in charge of the anticorruption agenda, anticorruption measures it 
uses are not hostile to the concepts of a limited separation of powers, transparency 
and public deliberation and participation — all building blocks for democratic 
governance. The continuation of China’s anticorruption campaign relies on the 
continuous adaptation of the liberal-oriented institutions as much as the one-Party 
authoritarianism.  
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Those new institutional reforms signal the Party’s commitment to adapt and learn; and 
there is sufficient evidence to prove that the Party has adapted and learned a lot. 
Whether the Party can buy enough time to reform itself in time and pre-empt a 
corruption-generated political crisis is unknown. Corruption certainly exists in every 
political system and democracy per se does not offer any panacea. There is also strong 
evidence that corruption could be effectively controlled under authoritarianism. But 
China’s authoritarian system faces a massive corruption problem which is deeply 
entrenched and intrinsically tied to the operation of the system. The Party may not be 
able to change itself in a significant way and, if that is the case, corruption will 
continue to spread and deepen. Without a deeper-level political reform, the 
institutional innovation and adaption will be too marginal, too slow and too little to 
have an impact. This paper argues that, for the time being, the implementation of the 
international anticorruption best practices in China has contributed to the Party’s 
political stability and authoritarian resilience. But the future remains uncertain and is 
unfolding as we speak.  
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